

Iran in UAE Foreign Policy (2018-1992): The UAE's Search for Identity

Sam Mohammadpour^{1*} 

1. Postdoctoral Fellow, Faculty of World Studies, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

(* - Corresponding Author Email: mohamadpour@ut.ac.ir)

Received: 2018-04-07

Revised: 2025-11-18

Accepted: 2026-06-01

Available Online: 2026-06-30

How to cite this article:

Mohammadpour, S. (2026). Iran in UAE Foreign Policy (1992-2018): The UAE's Search for Identity. *Iranian Political Studies Journal*, 1(2): (137 - 145).

<https://doi.org/10.22067/ips.2026.63500.0>

Abstract

From a constructivist perspective, foreign policy crises often coincide with processes of identity formation. In this context, the United Arab Emirates' (UAE) foreign policy toward Iran between 1992 and 2018 can be interpreted as part of an effort to reconstruct a distinct Emirati national identity. The UAE's complex internal structure and cultural diversity make identity a central element of its *raison d'être*. By adopting antagonistic policies toward Iran, UAE leaders have sought to rally domestic public opinion in order to reinforce national unity and nationalism. At the regional level, portraying Iran as an "enemy" or a definitive "Other" has elevated the UAE's profile in the Persian Gulf and enabled its leaders to redefine national interests in identity-based terms. Iran's domestic challenges and its comparatively weakened regional role during this period further encouraged Abu Dhabi to pursue this approach. Consequently, the UAE's unfriendly stance toward Iran aligns with its nation-building objectives by consolidating internal political cohesion and seeking validation and support within its regional environment. These policies of tension, therefore, are not merely expressions of power politics but serve the UAE's identity-driven strategy for regime legitimacy and regional stature.

Keywords: Constructivism; Foreign Policy; Nation-Building; Persian Gulf Politics.

1. Introduction

Iran's immediate neighborhood includes both Arab and non-Arab states with diverse relationships with the Islamic Republic. To Iran's south lie the Arab members of the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), mostly small monarchies that have experienced rapid economic growth over the past four decades due to abundant oil and gas resources. These Gulf states combine modern and efficient bureaucratic structures with traditional ruling systems, delivering effective governance and high living standards for their citizens, even though political power remains concentrated in ruling families (Foley, 1999). Geographic proximity between Iran and the Persian Gulf states has increased their mutual vulnerability and frequently produced overlapping or conflicting interests. Among these states, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) occupies a distinctive position. Over the past two decades, the UAE has outpaced

many regional countries in modernization and wealth creation and has maintained a particularly complex relationship with Iran. On the one hand, economic exchanges have strengthened ties between the UAE and Iran. The UAE was among Iran's top trading partners during this period—bilateral trade reached nearly \$13 billion in 2017 (Keynoush, 2021)—and in some years the UAE accounted for roughly 30% of Iran's total imports. On the other hand, political tensions between the two countries have persisted since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Despite the substantial economic benefits that the Emirati economy derives from trade with Iran, the UAE's policies—especially after 1979—suggest that its leadership has often tolerated, and at times even welcomed, friction in the relationship. This apparent paradox raises a central question: why has the UAE government accepted, and in some instances encouraged, tensions and hostile policies toward Iran?

This article investigates the significant role of identity in shaping the UAE's foreign policy behavior toward Iran during the period 1992–2018. The territorial dispute between the UAE and Iran over the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb re-emerged as a prominent issue in the early 1990s. In April 1992, the UAE initiated a series of actions to advance its longstanding claims, initially focusing on Abu Musa and later extending to the Tunb islands (Mojtahed-Zadeh et al., 2012). Iran's decision in April 1992 to restrict access to Abu Musa and assert full administrative control triggered a renewed wave of diplomatic tension, prompting the UAE to elevate the issue in regional and international forums. This episode marked the first major escalation of the dispute since the 1970s.

From that point onward, the UAE launched an extensive international campaign to gain support for its territorial claims. Emirati officials engaged in sustained diplomatic efforts—ranging from media initiatives to high-level diplomatic engagements—aimed at reinforcing the UAE's claims over the islands. Iran, for its part, has consistently maintained that its sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands is non-negotiable, while occasionally expressing willingness to discuss practical arrangements within the framework of the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding (Al Jazeera, 2004). Selecting 1992 as the starting point of this study allows us to capture this critical turning point, when a relatively dormant dispute became an active foreign policy issue. The period from 1992 to 2018 thus encompasses the renewed trajectory of the conflict and its evolution through the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, covering the key diplomatic, legal, and security developments from the dispute's re-emergence through its status in 2018.

In the field of international relations, cultural and ideational factors such as identity have often received less attention than material variables. Dominant paradigms such as realism and liberalism tend to prioritize military and economic power over ideational elements. In contrast, this study emphasizes how national identity can shape a country's perception of its interests and influence the behavior of its foreign policy.

2. Methodology

Constructivism, as one of the most influential approaches in contemporary international relations theory, has attracted considerable attention for offering a nuanced understanding of global politics and for bridging material and ideational perspectives. If realism is primarily materialist and idealism primarily ideational, constructivism occupies an intermediate position that integrates both dimensions. Constructivists, whether modernist or postmodernist, generally base their analysis on three core ontological propositions.

First, normative structures matter alongside material ones. Neorealism and neoliberalism assume that the main sources of power and influence in the international system are material capabilities, such as military and economic assets (Hopf, 1998). Constructivists argue, however, that norms, ideas, and culture play an equally important role in shaping international outcomes.

Second, identities constitute actors' interests and shape their actions. Identities are essential for reducing uncertainty, as they help states understand "who they are," which in turn influences what they want. While neorealists treat state interests as fixed and exogenously determined, independent of social interaction, constructivists emphasize that interests are constituted through identity. Explaining a state's interests, therefore, requires analyzing its identity (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998).

Third, actors and structures are mutually constituted. Constructivists maintain that while normative structures shape the identities of actors, these structures are themselves produced and reproduced through the practices of those actors. As Wendt (1992) argues, "it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests."

Within this framework, identity and its role in foreign policy become central. A constructivist understanding of identity views it as neither permanent and unchanging nor entirely flexible and instrumental. Identity contains relatively stable themes while also taking dynamic forms. In other words, national identity is continuously reshaped, and it is not possible to regard it as permanently fixed (Nasri, 2006).

In constructivist foreign policy analysis, action and interaction are functions of actors' self-understanding. Each actor, possessing a particular identity, develops a specific self-conception and a set of role expectations, which shape how it approaches relations with others. Accordingly, an actor's perception of the "Other" informs its definition of interests and the policies that follow, even when these policies diverge from material considerations. The nature of interaction between actors largely depends on the distinction between the Self and the Other.

Constructivists further argue that identity provides a cognitive framework that reduces uncertainty. By knowing "who we are" and "who the enemy is," states can transform indecision into calculated policy. Identity motivates international actors to shape structures, while those same structures, in turn, influence actors' identities and interests. Within the broader structure of international norms, states express their identities through foreign policy behavior and derive a sense of security from this expression. Cultural factors and national identity, therefore, become crucial variables in understanding how national interests are formed. From this perspective, identity shapes worldviews and patterns of international interaction.

Constructivists also contend that what states want depends on whom they interact with, the degree of their dependence on those actors, what they learn through interaction, and how they legitimize their claims. Two propositions follow from this view. First, the more an actor's legitimacy is tied to the shared norms of a community, the more likely it is to accept policies it might otherwise reject on the basis of narrow self-interest. Second, an actor's fundamental priorities can change over time as continuous interaction leads to the redefinition of both the Self and the Other (Moshirzadeh, 2005).

In summary, within the constructivist framework, states are central actors whose behavior is not strictly predictable, particularly during periods of change. What alters state behavior is the evolving construction of identities and interests through interaction. Applying constructivism to foreign pol-

icy analysis helps explain why the UAE's policies toward Iran have taken their particular form, as the concept of identity provides insight into the UAE's behavior and decision-making in this relationship. Methodologically, this study adopts a qualitative approach. Specifically, it employs discourse analysis of statements by UAE leaders and relevant policy documents to examine how Emirati leaders construct and articulate national identity in relation to Iran. Official speeches, press releases, and public statements concerning Iran—especially those referring to the three islands dispute and portraying Iran as an “enemy” or “Other”—serve as the primary sources for analysis. This qualitative interpretive method is consistent with constructivism's emphasis on the role of language, discourse, and ideas in shaping state identities and interests.

3. The Impact of Identity-Building on UAE Foreign Policy

Although a country's foreign policy is shaped by multiple factors, this article emphasizes the role of identity because its influence is often underestimated in the case of the UAE. The Emirati leadership's efforts at identity-building have at times overshadowed other priorities, including economic interests, in shaping foreign policy choices. In other words, identity-building has imposed significant material and symbolic costs on the UAE leadership, yet it continues to be a central investment (Davidson, 2008; Ulrichsen, 2011).

The primacy of identity considerations has led Abu Dhabi to securitize its approach toward Tehran, allowing security concerns to take precedence over economic ones. From a constructivist perspective, identity shapes worldviews and patterns of international interaction (Adib-Moghaddam, 2006; Barnett, 1998). The UAE's policy toward Iran is therefore influenced not only by regional challenges and territorial disputes but also by its Arab-oriented identity.

In the Middle East, multiple layers of identity coexist. Transnational identities such as Islam and Arabism overlap with subnational affiliations such as tribal and ethnic ties, alongside an evolving national identity. The competition among these identities across regional actors generates a complex pattern of cooperation and conflict. In the UAE, national identity assumes particular importance compared to some neighboring states and strongly influences the foreign policy calculations of the Al Nahyan ruling family. Abu Dhabi's approach to Iran is thus driven less by conventional material considerations of convergence or divergence and more by identity-building and nation-forming imperatives.

Using nation-building instruments, the UAE leadership has pursued domestic and regional policies aimed at reinforcing the cohesion of the national state. Consequently, the UAE's policy toward the Islamic Republic of Iran is shaped less by material factors and more by ideational components, with material interests often framed in ways that support national identity objectives.

4. Why the UAE Is Searching for Identity

As a relatively young state, the United Arab Emirates has faced significant political and social challenges from a geo-cultural perspective. Issues such as a loosely integrated federal structure, a predominantly non-indigenous population, limited historical continuity, and extensive ethnic and religious diversity have contributed to a weak sense of shared national identity. For this reason, UAE officials have viewed nation-building and identity construction as essential tools for addressing these challenges. By promoting nationalism and cultivating a shared historical and cultural narrative, the leadership seeks to strengthen national unity and position the UAE as an influential regional actor.

4.1. The Lack of Historical Context

The UAE's identity challenges can be partly understood through its historical context. Sheikh Zayed once stated, "He who does not know his past cannot make the best of his present and future, for it is from the past that we learn." Despite this sentiment, there remains a notable lack of public knowledge about UAE history among both Emiratis and expatriates. A survey conducted for The National and Al Aan TV by YouGov found that very few respondents were able to answer basic questions about UAE history, even regarding relatively recent events (KHDA, 2012).

The UAE lacks a deeply entrenched, unified historical narrative and collective national memory, and therefore does not benefit from strong organic social cohesion. Emirati citizens constitute a relatively small minority of the population—only about one in five residents is a citizen—which further limits the development of a shared historical identity.

4.2. Structural Differences

Another challenge stems from the UAE's political structure. The country is a federal union of seven emirates, and political power is not evenly distributed among them. The designation of Abu Dhabi as the federal capital has gradually contributed to the centralization of authority in that emirate. This imbalance has periodically fueled tensions and rivalries among the emirates, particularly the three largest: Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah.

For decades, the UAE government has also faced internal structural challenges, including scarce water resources, uneven distribution of capital and development across emirates, and social tensions between tradition and modernity (Foley, 1999). However, the federation has tended to display unity when confronted with external disputes or perceived foreign threats. Emirati officials have often mitigated internal discord by invoking territorial grievances or allegations of homeland "occupation" by neighboring states, especially Iran, thereby rallying citizens around a shared national cause.

4.3. Cultural and Ethnic Discontinuity

Tribal affiliations and demographic imbalance have further complicated the development of a cohesive national identity. As noted by Khalid al-Khazraji, "Dubai is home to 202 nationalities; the country has one of the highest rates of nationality diversity in the world" (Khaleej Times, 2006). Paradoxically, the combined Arab population (Emirati nationals and Arab expatriates) constitutes less than half of the total population, and only around one million residents—approximately 19 percent—are native Emiratis (Index Mundi, 2016).

This high degree of ethnic and cultural heterogeneity is often perceived by the government as a vulnerability, since greater societal cohesion could facilitate more effective governance and decision-making. The issue has been significant enough that Emirati commentator Sultan Sooud Al-Qassemi suggested that the government consider granting citizenship to long-term foreign residents who have made meaningful contributions to society (Gulf News, 2013).

5. The Identity and the UAE from the Perspective of Constructivism

Constructivists argue that claims related to territory, sovereignty, and national identity are closely aligned with cultural ideals. In this context, the UAE's persistent territorial claims over the three islands can be understood as an extension of this principle. Since its formation, the United Arab Emir-

ates has engaged in sustained diplomatic and symbolic efforts regarding its claims of sovereignty over Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Some scholars suggest that segments of Emirati society—particularly younger generations—have experienced elements of identity uncertainty, prompting the leadership to pursue policies aimed at fostering a sense of unity and collective purpose through this political and cultural campaign. The dispute with Iran, which is linked to the absence of a deeply rooted pre-existing national identity, has thus been elevated into a central national issue through the UAE's claims over the islands.

Invoking territorial disputes with another state is a recognized strategy through which newly formed states seek to consolidate nationhood and articulate a clearer national identity. In the UAE's case, the dispute with Iran—the only non-Arab state on the Persian Gulf littoral—appears to have provided an opportunity to promote national unity and reinforce an Emirati Arab identity. Historically, comparable patterns of nation-building through territorial claims have appeared elsewhere in the region. For example, Iran under Reza Shah in the 1930s advanced claims over Bahrain as part of efforts to strengthen Iranian national consciousness, and Iraq's Baathist regime in the mid-twentieth century asserted claims over Iran's Khuzestan province ("Arabistan") to stimulate Iraqi Arab nationalism (Mojtahed-zadeh, 2006).

Such historical narratives contributed to the emergence of broader anti-Iranian (and at times anti-Persian) rhetoric among certain strands of Arab nationalism over several decades. One dimension of this involved attempts to alter established geographical terminology—for instance, promoting the term "Arabian Gulf" instead of "Persian Gulf," or referring to Khuzestan as "Arabistan"—in order to emphasize Arab identity and minimize Persian historical associations. In this respect, the UAE's approach has, to some extent, reflected similar strategies, with the perception that confronting a non-Arab presence in the Gulf could contribute to strengthening a distinct Emirati Arab identity.

The UAE has faced continuing challenges in fostering deep national cohesion among its seven emirates, each with its own tribal and local identity. The absence of a strong external challenge during the country's formative years meant that the nation-building process lacked a unifying stimulus often present in other state-building experiences. From a constructivist perspective, the UAE's firm positions regarding the islands and its broader critical stance toward Iran can therefore be interpreted as efforts both to reinforce national identity domestically and to enhance its standing and recognition at the regional and international levels (Mojtahed-zadeh, 2007).

5.1. Identity-Building for the Nation-State

Because the UAE's state structure was established before a fully consolidated nation had emerged, its leaders have had to actively pursue nation-building in order to strengthen social cohesion, enhance political stability, and improve the effectiveness of governance. Similar patterns can be observed in other states whose borders and institutions were shaped by external powers and which lacked an organic internal unity, leaving their national identity relatively fragile (Blake and Drysdale, 1985).

Given the UAE's limited historical social cohesion, one of the leadership's primary tasks has been to cultivate a compelling sense of nationalism through identity construction. This process is closely linked to the country's confrontational posture toward Iran. Ongoing tensions with Iran over the islands—and even symbolic issues such as the naming of the Persian Gulf—have been incorporated into a broader narrative that reinforces the state's *raison d'être* and fosters a sense of shared national pur-

pose. Historical experience suggests that the perception of an external threat can strengthen internal unity and solidarity. In the UAE's case, heightened tensions with Iran have often served to bring the seven emirates together, encouraging them to set aside internal differences and reinforcing federal cohesion. Such external disputes have contributed to national solidarity and stimulated expressions of Emirati nationalism at the popular level (Barzegar, 2012).

At the same time, the UAE remains highly heterogeneous in ethnic and religious composition, and a fully crystallized nation-state identity has yet to emerge. These conditions create internal vulnerabilities, particularly in an era of globalization when questions of identity and legitimacy become central political and security concerns. The leadership is also mindful of the destabilizing effects that major upheavals in neighboring states—such as revolutions or regime changes—could have on the UAE. In response, the country has sought to preserve the regional status quo with fellow Arab states, strengthen alliances with them, and maintain close ties with external powers, all as part of a broader strategy to accelerate its nation-building process (Mojtahedzadeh, 2006).

A heterogeneous population remains one of the main obstacles to deeper national integration and the development of a cohesive nation-state. In such socially diverse settings, populist narratives can emerge as a means of counteracting centrifugal forces. One example in the UAE context is the leadership's emphasis on using the term "Arabian Gulf" instead of "Persian Gulf," a practice that gained prominence after the formation of the UAE. By positioning itself within a longstanding historical and symbolic dispute and adopting a stance in opposition to Iran, the leadership has attempted to shape a shared historical-cultural framework for Emirati identity.

Beyond public rhetoric and media discourse, elements of this identity narrative have also appeared in educational materials. Reports suggest that some school textbooks have used terminology such as "Arabistan" when referring to parts of Iran's southern coastline. These efforts are intended to cultivate a stronger sense of collective identity and promote Emirati nationalism, reflecting policies that have been pursued since the country's early years (Mojtahedzadeh, 2006).

5.2. Identity-Building for Regional Standing

Between 1992 and 2018, the United Arab Emirates consistently sought to position itself as a key actor in the Persian Gulf region. In line with the internal and external challenges discussed earlier, Emirati leaders have repeatedly attempted to consolidate the country's legitimacy by cultivating perceptions of external threats or crises. In particular, Iran has been portrayed as a potential challenge to UAE statehood, both regionally and internationally. By highlighting this threat, the UAE strengthens domestic nationalism and internal cohesion, while simultaneously signaling its concerns to neighboring Arab states, many of which historically regard Iran with suspicion.

Abu Dhabi has strategically exploited the historical and ongoing Arab-Iranian tensions to reinforce its national identity and assert its role in the regional order. The UAE's policy of antagonizing Iran serves dual purposes: it bolsters internal legitimacy and national unity, and it secures political support from other Arab states, particularly members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This approach explains why the UAE has persistently raised its territorial claims against Iran in collective forums, including the GCC and the Arab League (Barzegar, 2012).

Security in the Persian Gulf is understood not only as a material reality but also as a mental construct. The perception of threats directly shapes how states define their interests and interpret their identi-

ties, which in turn guides their foreign policy behavior. Iran's long history and ancient civilization foster a self-conception of grandeur, which has contributed to anti-Iran sentiment—commonly referred to as “Iranophobia”—among some Arab audiences. This sentiment influences the foreign policies of several Gulf states, motivating counterbalancing measures against Iran (Roohidehbaneh, 2012).

The UAE finds a favorable historical and cultural context for framing Iran as an adversary. As a non-Arab state, Iran does not conform to the Arab identity predominant in the Gulf region; sectarian differences, particularly the Sunni-Shia divide, further accentuate this distinction. With Arab nationalism becoming a central element of regional identity, non-Arab states like Iran are increasingly cast as out-group actors. Historically, Iranian nationalism and Arab nationalism have often clashed: Pan-Arabism and Arab nationalist agendas frequently conflicted with Iran's national interests, and vice versa. Emirati leaders consciously leverage this long-standing Arab-Persian rivalry to advance their identity-building objectives, using it to consolidate national cohesion and regional influence (Roohidehbaneh, 2012).

6. Conclusion

This study has examined the UAE's policy toward Iran through a constructivist lens. The findings suggest that the United Arab Emirates' efforts at identity-building significantly shaped its strategic posture toward Iran during the period 1992–2018. By sustaining tensions with Iran, the UAE has sought to cultivate a stronger sense of national identity domestically while simultaneously enhancing its standing among regional peers. Abu Dhabi's firm posture has also been facilitated by Iran's relatively restrained responses during these years. Iran's internal socio-political challenges and its comparatively limited regional engagement created conditions in which Emirati leaders felt able to pursue their claims and objectives—closely tied to identity-building and nationhood—without anticipating substantial retaliation.

This analysis also helps explain why Emirati decision-makers have shown limited inclination toward rapprochement with Tehran. The dispute over the three islands, which came under Iranian control shortly before the UAE's independence in 1971, has served as a recurring focal point for national identity narratives. Particularly after the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the UAE repeatedly emphasized its sovereignty claims over the islands as a unifying national issue. The federation's underlying geo-cultural challenges—including a loosely integrated federal structure, ethnic and religious diversity, the absence of a deeply rooted historical narrative, and the need for a clearly articulated political identity—have encouraged the leadership to promote a unifying external cause. Framing Iran as an external adversary has helped provide that cause, reinforcing nationalism internally while raising the UAE's profile in its regional environment.

Constructivist theory, with its emphasis on the interaction between material and ideational factors and the formation of “Self” and “Other” identities, offers a useful framework for understanding the UAE's behavior toward Iran. In contrast to realist or liberal approaches, constructivism highlights how the UAE's perceptions of itself and of Iran shape its understanding of national interests. In the decades since its formation, the UAE has achieved many of its material objectives through economic growth and development, becoming a major center of trade and commerce. The country's current priorities, however, extend beyond material prosperity to include the consolidation and internalization of a cohesive Emirati national identity.

References

- Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2005). Islamic utopian romanticism and the foreign policy culture of Iran. *Middle East Critique*, 14(3), 265–292.
- Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2006). *The international politics of the Persian Gulf: A cultural genealogy*. London, UK: Routledge.
- Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2013). *On the Arab revolts and the Iranian revolution: Power and resistance today*. New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic.
- Al Jazeera. (2004, December 5). Iran reiterates claim to Gulf islands. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2004/12/5/iran-reiterates-claim-to-gulf-islands>
- Barnett, M. (1998). *Dialogues in Arab politics: Negotiations in regional order*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Barzegar, K. (2012). Artificial islands in the Persian Gulf and Iran's national interest. *Shargh Newspaper* (1205), 3. [In Persian]
- Blake, G., & Drysdale, A. (1985). *The Middle East and North Africa: A political geography*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Davidson, C. M. (2008). *Dubai: The vulnerability of success*. London, UK: Hurst.
- Foley, S. (1999). The UAE: Political issues and security dilemmas. *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 3(1), 25–45. <http://www.rubincenter.org/1999/03/foley-1999-03-03/>
- Gulf News. (2013) Give Expats an Opportunity to Earn UAE Citizenship. September 13, 2013. <https://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/give-expats-an-opportunity-to-earn-uae-citizenship-1.1234167>
- Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. *International Security*, 23(1), 171–200.
- Index Mundi. (2016). United Arab Emirates – Ethnic Groups. October 8, 2016. http://www.indexmundi.com/united_arab_emirates/ethnic_groups.html
- Keynoush, B. (2021, February 26). Diplomacy with Iran: Opportunities and risks for the UAE. Gulf States Institute in Washington. <https://agsiw.org/diplomacy-with-iran-opportunities-and-risks-for-the-uae/>
- Khaleej Times. (2006). 202 Nationalities in Labor Market. August 25, 2006. <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/article/202-nationalities-in-labour-market>
- Knowledge and Human Development Authority (KHDA). (2012). “For Most of Us, the Past Is Another Country.” May 13, 2012. <https://web.khda.gov.ae/en/About-Us/News/2012/For-most-of-us,-the-past-is-another-country>
- Mojtahed-Zadeh, P. (1994). Iran's maritime boundaries in the Persian Gulf: The case of Abu Musa Island. In K. McLachlan (Ed.), *The boundaries of modern Iran* (pp. 106–109). New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Mojtahed-Zadeh, P. (2006). A look at some of the more recently propagated UAE arguments. Unpublished manuscript.
- Mojtahed-Zadeh, P. (2007). *The UAE and Iranian islands of Tunbs and Abu Musa*. Paris, France: Institut International d'Études Stratégiques.
- Mojtahed-Zadeh, P., Ahmadypour, Z., & Heidari Mosello, T. (2012). Explanation of UAE claims against three Iranian islands. *Geopolitics Quarterly*, 8(25), 42–81.
- Moshirzadeh, H. (2005). Revolution in international relations theories [In Persian]. Tehran, Iran: SAMT.
- Nasri, G. (2006). The nature of regime change in the Arab world. *Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly*, 10(1–2), 61–96.
- Price, R., & Reus-Smit, C. (1998). Dangerous liaisons? Critical international theory and constructivism. *European Journal of International Relations*, 4(3), 259–294.
- Roohidehbaneh, M. (2012). A constructivist explanation of divergence between Iran and the GCC [In Persian]. *Foreign Relations Quarterly*, 13, 79–112.
- Ulrichsen, K. C. (2011). *Insecure Gulf: The end of certainty and the transition to the post-oil era*. London, UK: Hurst.
- Wendt, A. (1992). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.